Three Israeli experts discuss a potential war with Hezbollah
Jun 27, 2024 19:07:33 GMT -5
Post by shalom on Jun 27, 2024 19:07:33 GMT -5
A look into Lebanon: Three Israeli experts discuss a potential war with Hezbollah - interview
Vice Rector of Tel Aviv University, the Founder of Bar Ilan's Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, and a Researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security speak to 'The Post'
By OHAD MERLIN
JUNE 27, 2024 18:11
Updated: JUNE 27, 2024 18:16
There is significant ongoing discourse from both Israeli and Lebanese officials regarding the prospects of a potential war between Israel and Hezbollah, and the warnings of governments across several countries telling their citizens to refrain from visiting Lebanon out of fear of an imminent war.
The Jerusalem Post reached out to three Israeli experts to learn about their differing views regarding the question of the inevitability of a war, the expected course of such a confrontation, the wanted results and the geopolitical outcomes of a confrontation – or a lack thereof.
Professor Eyal Zisser: "IDF is prepared and ready in case a diplomatic approach fails."
The current situation with which Israel and Hezbollah have been coping for the past eight months grew to become a status quo to which both sides tolerate on some level, despite it being a bad situation. This is because both sides understand that the alternative would be destructive war that will not fundamentally change the situation and will hardly yield any achievements.
Prime Minister Netanyahu also said something along these lines when he referred to MK Gantz’s ultimatum calling for the Israeli government to set the beginning of September as a deadline to bring residents of the north back to their homes, adding that there should be no rush and no deadlines.
(L-R): Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, War cabinet minister Benny Gantz on June 8, 2024 (credit: FLASH90, POOL)
A second option is that of a diplomatic agreement. The problem here is the interdependence that Hezbollah has drawn with the situation in Gaza as a condition for halting its paramilitary activity; but nothing is going to change in the foreseeable future from the Israeli perspective in Gaza. Nasrallah will also find it difficult to comply with the Israeli demand to withdraw his forces beyond the Litani. He may be able to do so, though without announcing it openly. For these reasons, a political agreement seems implausible.
If these two options are exhausted, the question would then become political: how much political pressure would be applied on the Israeli government in order to push Israel to act in Lebanon. I don’t see a strategic consideration in going to an all-out war. In any case it is difficult to say what decision makers will opt for, and what the outcome of the war will be.
It should be noted that it is not necessarily an ‘all or nothing’ situation, either an all-out war or peace. Israel can decide to opt for a limited operation with limited goals in Southern Lebanon, which wouldn’t necessarily entail dragging the entire region into an all-out war. As lovers of “equations,” Hezbollah would probably tolerate not attacking the Israeli center should Israel refrain from attacking Beirut, though surely things can escalate.
In terms of the desired achievements, for Israel it would be centered around achieving military goals: Israel would like to strike Hezbollah's top brass, as always, and paralyze its capabilities; but without a ground intrusion this will not happen. If Israel does decide to go all the way, Israel could indeed demand more.
From their point of view, Hezbollah will want tactical surprises and symbolic photo-ops: infiltrating communities with soldiers, successfully shooting down planes, and hitting symbolic landmarks.
As for their capabilities, Hezbollah appears to have the ability to shoot down planes, but these are limited to geographical location. Additionally, they can probably strike anywhere in the State of Israel with precision, but not on an unlimited scale, as not all their missiles are like that. Additionally, when missiles are fired, they also reveal the location of the launcher, so the air force can strike the location directly following the launch.
Smoke rises during an exchange of fire between the IDF and terrorists from the Hezbollah organization on the border between Israel and Lebanon, January 7, 2024. (credit: Ayal Margolin/Flash90)Enlrage image
Smoke rises during an exchange of fire between the IDF and terrorists from the Hezbollah organization on the border between Israel and Lebanon, January 7, 2024. (credit: Ayal Margolin/Flash90)
In terms of the geopolitical aspects, Iran has proven that it is embedded in Yemen and Iraq and Lebanon, and this is a challenging reality which will continue whether a war ensues or not. Some militias in Syria may join some of the efforts, but not in a substantial way.
On the home front, Hezbollah faces much internal pressure from civilians not affiliated with the Shi’i group, which is very helpful because it makes Hezbollah more cautious and restrained; however, this pressure will not be enough to bring the terror group to give up or avoid a confrontation altogether.
In case of a war, the main question will come down to who will be opening it and who will surprise whom. However, there is a tendency in Israel to exaggerate its dangers. Yes, we will suffer some blows, but the IDF is prepared and ready and won’t be surprised any more. We must hope for the best, not become paralyzed, and not panic.
Professor Gerald Steinberg: ‘Key to deterrence lies in convincing Iran that their survival lies with ending Hezbollah’s attacks’
Hezbollah is the central Iranian proxy in the regime’s ongoing war against Israel. Therefore, in order to deter, or if necessary, defeat this powerful Lebanon-based military force, Israel will need to directly confront Tehran and threaten its vital interests and survival.
Throughout human history, credible deterrence has been the essential element in military conflict, but in confining threats of unacceptable destruction to Beirut, which for Iran is expendable, Israel’s security leadership has missed the target. This needs to change.
Because Iran perceives Israel to be vulnerable and unwilling to act forcefully, the threat of unacceptable damage to Iranian interests is essential – for example, by highlighting key oil industry targets, particularly given Hezbollah’s threats to attack Haifa and other Israeli strategic targets. Destruction of Iran’s very vulnerable oil industry would trigger a serious crisis. The economy has been sputtering for years, causing unemployment and feeding popular unrest, and would become far worse if oil exports were to stop for a long period. And there are additional and vulnerable strategic targets, as hinted in Israel’s very limited response to the Iranian missile assault of April 14.
On the other hand, to prevent the full-scale regional conflict and worldwide energy crisis that the Biden Administration clearly wants to avoid, the US with some European governments (Germany and Italy, for example) also need to shift Amos Hochstein’s diplomatic efforts from Beirut to Tehran. While by no means an easy task, the key to deterrence is convincing Iran’s leaders that their survival depends on ending Hezbollah’s attacks and finding a formula to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) by pulling back behind the Litani river.
The alternative - a direct military confrontation limited to Lebanon and Hezbollah’s massive arsenal of missiles, drones, and short-range weapons, is likely to do unacceptable damage to Israel, and leave the Iranian threat intact, including near-operational first-generation nuclear weapons. This is an unacceptable scenario, and requires an immediate and credible strategic shift.
Dr. Omer Dostri: ‘Israel must militarily defeat Hezbollah’
A political settlement with Lebanon is not in sight, despite many international efforts led by the United States. It seems that a war between Israel and Lebanon is not a matter of if, but when.
The idea of Hezbollah withdrawing beyond the Litani is based on an outdated and dangerous concept dating back to the reality of before October 7th. Hezbollah’s withdrawal beyond the Litani will not lead to a change in reality, certainly not in the long term.
In such a case, Hezbollah could quickly return to the south, and it is likely that Israel will not react to this due to its reluctance to go to war, as has happened in recent decades. Moreover, there is a significant reason to assume that the international forces will not be able to force Hezbollah to withdraw to the north, either in the implementation of the new agreement, or after Hezbollah returns to the region for a short period of time after its apparent retreat to the north.
Even if we assume that Hezbollah will eventually signal a proactive retreat beyond the Litani River, this step may increase the sense of security of the Israeli population adjacent to the border, which will pave its way back to the settlements. However, it is important to emphasize that Hezbollah's threat to Israel does not end only with the penetration of the border and the takeover of communities adjacent to the fence. Rather Hezbollah is a threat to the entire State of Israel, so it would be a mistake to examine the issue in the north only from the angle of the border communities in the north.
For this reason, Israel will also not be able to settle for a new resolution in the UN Security Council (certainly not on the basis of the previous resolution 1701) that will not provide security for the state as a whole, as has been proven in recent decades. The security of the State of Israel cannot be based on foreign forces, certainly not ‘peacekeeping’ forces that have almost no authority and no ability to face the threat of Hezbollah, and the strengthening of the terrorist organization.
Israel will have to militarily defeat Hezbollah. There won't be another chance for that.
Moreover, the exercise of Israel's military power cannot be done in the framework of a "deterrence operation" in the style of the Second Lebanon War, but it must be done in the framework of a broad and comprehensive war through an invasion and land maneuver deep into Lebanon. Therefore, the Israeli government is required to prepare the Israeli public for a broad war in Lebanon that will destroy the Hezbollah organization, including the occupation of all of southern Lebanon, and the destruction of Beirut and other major cities in Lebanon.
At the same time, a war with Hezbollah would be a very significant event for the Israeli home front, as it has not yet experienced.
Hezbollah has at its disposal over 150,000 missiles and rockets, thousands of long-range missiles, hundreds of precision missiles, a large inventory of anti-tank missiles, fleets of drones, good anti-aircraft capabilities, and more. The greatest threat to the home front, the possibility of an invasion by special forces, was apparently thwarted and stopped with the rapid and efficient deployment of IDF forces along the border, and the ongoing attacks against Hezbollah forces and infrastructure near the border.
In the geopolitical aspect, Israel's war against Hezbollah in Lebanon carries with it the possibility of escalating into a regional war that could also involve Iran, and consequently the United States as well. Therefore, the Biden administration, which is interested in restoring regional stability as soon as possible (especially in light of the presidential elections of the United States this coming November), is exerting its full weight on Israel in order to prevent a war with Lebanon.
Also, it is likely that in the war with Hezbollah, the Shia militias in Iraq and Syria will also join, as well as the Houthis from Yemen. In such a situation, Syria will likely not be immune from extensive Israeli attacks.
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Vice Rector of Tel Aviv University, the Founder of Bar Ilan's Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, and a Researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security speak to 'The Post'
By OHAD MERLIN
JUNE 27, 2024 18:11
Updated: JUNE 27, 2024 18:16
There is significant ongoing discourse from both Israeli and Lebanese officials regarding the prospects of a potential war between Israel and Hezbollah, and the warnings of governments across several countries telling their citizens to refrain from visiting Lebanon out of fear of an imminent war.
The Jerusalem Post reached out to three Israeli experts to learn about their differing views regarding the question of the inevitability of a war, the expected course of such a confrontation, the wanted results and the geopolitical outcomes of a confrontation – or a lack thereof.
Professor Eyal Zisser: "IDF is prepared and ready in case a diplomatic approach fails."
The current situation with which Israel and Hezbollah have been coping for the past eight months grew to become a status quo to which both sides tolerate on some level, despite it being a bad situation. This is because both sides understand that the alternative would be destructive war that will not fundamentally change the situation and will hardly yield any achievements.
Prime Minister Netanyahu also said something along these lines when he referred to MK Gantz’s ultimatum calling for the Israeli government to set the beginning of September as a deadline to bring residents of the north back to their homes, adding that there should be no rush and no deadlines.
(L-R): Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, War cabinet minister Benny Gantz on June 8, 2024 (credit: FLASH90, POOL)
A second option is that of a diplomatic agreement. The problem here is the interdependence that Hezbollah has drawn with the situation in Gaza as a condition for halting its paramilitary activity; but nothing is going to change in the foreseeable future from the Israeli perspective in Gaza. Nasrallah will also find it difficult to comply with the Israeli demand to withdraw his forces beyond the Litani. He may be able to do so, though without announcing it openly. For these reasons, a political agreement seems implausible.
If these two options are exhausted, the question would then become political: how much political pressure would be applied on the Israeli government in order to push Israel to act in Lebanon. I don’t see a strategic consideration in going to an all-out war. In any case it is difficult to say what decision makers will opt for, and what the outcome of the war will be.
It should be noted that it is not necessarily an ‘all or nothing’ situation, either an all-out war or peace. Israel can decide to opt for a limited operation with limited goals in Southern Lebanon, which wouldn’t necessarily entail dragging the entire region into an all-out war. As lovers of “equations,” Hezbollah would probably tolerate not attacking the Israeli center should Israel refrain from attacking Beirut, though surely things can escalate.
In terms of the desired achievements, for Israel it would be centered around achieving military goals: Israel would like to strike Hezbollah's top brass, as always, and paralyze its capabilities; but without a ground intrusion this will not happen. If Israel does decide to go all the way, Israel could indeed demand more.
From their point of view, Hezbollah will want tactical surprises and symbolic photo-ops: infiltrating communities with soldiers, successfully shooting down planes, and hitting symbolic landmarks.
As for their capabilities, Hezbollah appears to have the ability to shoot down planes, but these are limited to geographical location. Additionally, they can probably strike anywhere in the State of Israel with precision, but not on an unlimited scale, as not all their missiles are like that. Additionally, when missiles are fired, they also reveal the location of the launcher, so the air force can strike the location directly following the launch.
Smoke rises during an exchange of fire between the IDF and terrorists from the Hezbollah organization on the border between Israel and Lebanon, January 7, 2024. (credit: Ayal Margolin/Flash90)Enlrage image
Smoke rises during an exchange of fire between the IDF and terrorists from the Hezbollah organization on the border between Israel and Lebanon, January 7, 2024. (credit: Ayal Margolin/Flash90)
In terms of the geopolitical aspects, Iran has proven that it is embedded in Yemen and Iraq and Lebanon, and this is a challenging reality which will continue whether a war ensues or not. Some militias in Syria may join some of the efforts, but not in a substantial way.
On the home front, Hezbollah faces much internal pressure from civilians not affiliated with the Shi’i group, which is very helpful because it makes Hezbollah more cautious and restrained; however, this pressure will not be enough to bring the terror group to give up or avoid a confrontation altogether.
In case of a war, the main question will come down to who will be opening it and who will surprise whom. However, there is a tendency in Israel to exaggerate its dangers. Yes, we will suffer some blows, but the IDF is prepared and ready and won’t be surprised any more. We must hope for the best, not become paralyzed, and not panic.
Professor Gerald Steinberg: ‘Key to deterrence lies in convincing Iran that their survival lies with ending Hezbollah’s attacks’
Hezbollah is the central Iranian proxy in the regime’s ongoing war against Israel. Therefore, in order to deter, or if necessary, defeat this powerful Lebanon-based military force, Israel will need to directly confront Tehran and threaten its vital interests and survival.
Throughout human history, credible deterrence has been the essential element in military conflict, but in confining threats of unacceptable destruction to Beirut, which for Iran is expendable, Israel’s security leadership has missed the target. This needs to change.
Because Iran perceives Israel to be vulnerable and unwilling to act forcefully, the threat of unacceptable damage to Iranian interests is essential – for example, by highlighting key oil industry targets, particularly given Hezbollah’s threats to attack Haifa and other Israeli strategic targets. Destruction of Iran’s very vulnerable oil industry would trigger a serious crisis. The economy has been sputtering for years, causing unemployment and feeding popular unrest, and would become far worse if oil exports were to stop for a long period. And there are additional and vulnerable strategic targets, as hinted in Israel’s very limited response to the Iranian missile assault of April 14.
On the other hand, to prevent the full-scale regional conflict and worldwide energy crisis that the Biden Administration clearly wants to avoid, the US with some European governments (Germany and Italy, for example) also need to shift Amos Hochstein’s diplomatic efforts from Beirut to Tehran. While by no means an easy task, the key to deterrence is convincing Iran’s leaders that their survival depends on ending Hezbollah’s attacks and finding a formula to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) by pulling back behind the Litani river.
The alternative - a direct military confrontation limited to Lebanon and Hezbollah’s massive arsenal of missiles, drones, and short-range weapons, is likely to do unacceptable damage to Israel, and leave the Iranian threat intact, including near-operational first-generation nuclear weapons. This is an unacceptable scenario, and requires an immediate and credible strategic shift.
Dr. Omer Dostri: ‘Israel must militarily defeat Hezbollah’
A political settlement with Lebanon is not in sight, despite many international efforts led by the United States. It seems that a war between Israel and Lebanon is not a matter of if, but when.
The idea of Hezbollah withdrawing beyond the Litani is based on an outdated and dangerous concept dating back to the reality of before October 7th. Hezbollah’s withdrawal beyond the Litani will not lead to a change in reality, certainly not in the long term.
In such a case, Hezbollah could quickly return to the south, and it is likely that Israel will not react to this due to its reluctance to go to war, as has happened in recent decades. Moreover, there is a significant reason to assume that the international forces will not be able to force Hezbollah to withdraw to the north, either in the implementation of the new agreement, or after Hezbollah returns to the region for a short period of time after its apparent retreat to the north.
Even if we assume that Hezbollah will eventually signal a proactive retreat beyond the Litani River, this step may increase the sense of security of the Israeli population adjacent to the border, which will pave its way back to the settlements. However, it is important to emphasize that Hezbollah's threat to Israel does not end only with the penetration of the border and the takeover of communities adjacent to the fence. Rather Hezbollah is a threat to the entire State of Israel, so it would be a mistake to examine the issue in the north only from the angle of the border communities in the north.
For this reason, Israel will also not be able to settle for a new resolution in the UN Security Council (certainly not on the basis of the previous resolution 1701) that will not provide security for the state as a whole, as has been proven in recent decades. The security of the State of Israel cannot be based on foreign forces, certainly not ‘peacekeeping’ forces that have almost no authority and no ability to face the threat of Hezbollah, and the strengthening of the terrorist organization.
Israel will have to militarily defeat Hezbollah. There won't be another chance for that.
Moreover, the exercise of Israel's military power cannot be done in the framework of a "deterrence operation" in the style of the Second Lebanon War, but it must be done in the framework of a broad and comprehensive war through an invasion and land maneuver deep into Lebanon. Therefore, the Israeli government is required to prepare the Israeli public for a broad war in Lebanon that will destroy the Hezbollah organization, including the occupation of all of southern Lebanon, and the destruction of Beirut and other major cities in Lebanon.
At the same time, a war with Hezbollah would be a very significant event for the Israeli home front, as it has not yet experienced.
Hezbollah has at its disposal over 150,000 missiles and rockets, thousands of long-range missiles, hundreds of precision missiles, a large inventory of anti-tank missiles, fleets of drones, good anti-aircraft capabilities, and more. The greatest threat to the home front, the possibility of an invasion by special forces, was apparently thwarted and stopped with the rapid and efficient deployment of IDF forces along the border, and the ongoing attacks against Hezbollah forces and infrastructure near the border.
In the geopolitical aspect, Israel's war against Hezbollah in Lebanon carries with it the possibility of escalating into a regional war that could also involve Iran, and consequently the United States as well. Therefore, the Biden administration, which is interested in restoring regional stability as soon as possible (especially in light of the presidential elections of the United States this coming November), is exerting its full weight on Israel in order to prevent a war with Lebanon.
Also, it is likely that in the war with Hezbollah, the Shia militias in Iraq and Syria will also join, as well as the Houthis from Yemen. In such a situation, Syria will likely not be immune from extensive Israeli attacks.
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