Possible Russian Responses to an Attack on Iran

[PrisonerOfHope]

Possible Russian Responses to an Attack on Iran
INSS Insight No. 327, April 17, 2012
Magen, Zvi
www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=6393

As international activity surrounding the Iranian nuclear program
intensifies, it seems that the question of a possible war on Iran is taking
center stage on Russia's agenda as well. There is evidence of heightened
diplomatic activity, along with military preparations and an expanded public
debate reflecting differences of opinion within the Russian establishment.

On the diplomatic and political levels, there has been extensive Russian
activity for quite some time, but the pace is accelerating to match the
heightened international pressure. Amidst this, the Russian stance on the
Iranian nuclear program has undergone several changes, in particular since
the publication of the most recent IAEA report. If before the report was
published Russia refused to recognize the existence of the Iranian program,
the current stance is as follows: Russia views the nuclear program in a
negative light and sees it as a threat to the international system and
Russia itself, but there is still no unequivocal evidence on the existence
of such a program (although some say that Iran is well on its way to
becoming a threshold state or has in fact already become one); the
international community must act to contain the program, but not by means of
sanctions, which are in any case ineffective and will not achieve their
goal; and of course, there should be no military action, which is deemed
catastrophic and harboring the seeds of destruction, both for the region and
on the global level. The only solution is the diplomatic one, and Russia
currently supports holding negotiations between the international community
and Iran, with Russia and the West cooperating in this endeavor. Russia
believes that it has a definite capacity to influence Iran, and it is likely
that Russia expects to translate this into bonus points on the international
arena. Indeed, Russia is expected to take an active part in the upcoming
P5+1 talks.

Thus for the diplomatic level. In tandem, there are Russian voices – fairly
authoritative ones, it should be said – averring that an attack on Iran is
already a done deal and will take place within the next few months. Some
identify an American intention to start an all-out war against Iran, even if
the attack is carried out by Israel. This is understood as a threat to
Russian interests because it is an attack on a Russian ally and a member of
the political axis headed by Russia. Moreover, such a war can be expected to
spill across Iran’s borders into the sphere of Russia’s geopolitical
interests, especially the Caucasus, and to draw regional states into the
conflict. At issue specifically are Azerbaijan and Georgia, together
representing one component of a Western strategic axis (it is customary to
mention Israel too in this context) blocking Russia’s access to the south,
as well as the Iranian border. Armenia is further south and is presented as
a member of the Russian-Iranian axis; Russian army units are currently
deployed there. In this setting one also hears of a scenario in which a
conflict between these Caucasus states can be expected (several reasons for
this have accumulated in recent years), in which Russia would be forced to
become involved and make its way south, through their territories, in order
to extend help to its allies – Armenia and Iran. Beyond this, dire warnings
about a large influx of refugees that would for some reason flee northwards
from an Iran under attack towards the Caucasus and eventually Russia itself
have been sounded from many quarters for quite some time. Even if this last
scenario is highly dubious, it has become a major (propaganda) justification
in Russia's regional military preparations.

Nor has the subject remained entirely theoretical, and in recent months
Russia has prepared in practical terms for just such a war. This includes
formulating operational and logistical solutions to prepare Russia's
southern regional district, via staff and troop exercises and including ABC
warfare, for a possible confrontation. The forces deployed across from the
likely arena of conflict – supposed to encompass regions beyond the
Caucasus, including the areas of the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, and the
Mediterranean – are being beefed up. The current Russian-Turkish tension is
also relevant in this context, as Turkey is liable to become an active enemy
of Russia. Also noteworthy is the activity of the Russian Navy in the
eastern part of the Mediterranean, which involves friction with the Turks in
the waters of Cyprus, and the constant presence across the coast of Syria,
Russia’s ally in the same axis (and Russia’s conduct on the Syrian issue
over the past year figures in this calculation as well).

All of the above has recently begun to surface in the media, and at the same
time there seems to be a kind of debate in Russia about the Iranian issue
among senior politicians, military personnel, and academics. Generally
speaking, one may discern two camps in this debate: the camp supporting a
war, spouting anti-Western slogans, and calling for violent action to
advance Russian regional and global interests while exploiting the situation
to solve ancillary geopolitical issues both in the Caucasus and the Middle
East. Some are calling to remove the threat from Iran, Russia’s ally, by
undercutting the sanctions, consolidating an anti-Western coalition, and
even threatening the use of strategic weapons. A few even view Iran’s desire
for nuclear weapons in a positive light – as a means of increasing regional
stability.

On the other hand, there are academic and public figures vehemently opposed
to these drums of war. Discerning elements that are interested in seeing a
war erupt in Iran that involves Russia, this camp warns of the destructive
ramifications of this scenario and calls for more modest Russian
international aspirations, with Russia taking a firm stand within the
international community and acting in concert with the other nations to
contain Iran’s nuclear program, whether through dialogue or through the
application of coordinated international pressure.

The impression has thus been created that Russia as yet has no clear,
unequivocal stance, at least externally, on how it would react if and when
Iran comes under attack. Internal disagreement reflects both indecisiveness
and various ambitions. Nonetheless, the preparations for a military response
to an attack on Iran seem genuine enough. At the same time, it appears that
Russia is not keen on direct military intervention on Iranian soil, but
would rather deal with one of the following scenarios:

a. One scenario would be meant to display power, perhaps by
moving military units to the Iranian border or by flying the flag around the
Caspian, Black, and Mediterranean Seas, while making use of bold rhetoric in
order to gain points on the international arena (suffice it to remember
Russia’s need to recover from damages incurred due to the Arab Spring).

b. In a second scenario, Russia could exploit an attack on
Iran – should the proper circumstances present themselves – to promote its
geopolitical interests in the Caucasus, while moving forces towards
Azerbaijan and Georgia to help its allies, solve humanitarian problems (such
as the flood of refugees), and engage in similar activities.

In any case, it seems that Russia is facing a dilemma over which there is
now a charged debate with implications for all sides involved.


www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=56506